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322.924 SE Finanzwissenschaft

Next course will take place in WS 2018!!


At this point you will find useful information about the course such as slides, etc. 

An interesting guide by William Thomson on how to write Economic Theory.

Slides part 1

General Information

Fairness is of major importance in private, group and public decisions. The division of land, the allocation of (user) rights, cost sharing, the analysis of economic systems, the matching of kidney donors to patients, the design of public policy programms or simple elections are all concerned in one way or the other with fairness. Many fair division, allocation and matching procedures have been devised and discussed in the literature. The structure of those algorithms, their applications to real world problems and their relation to theoretical results will be the core of this course.


1. Fair Division
2. Matching
3. Mechanism Design



Organisational Meeting: Mon 10 Oct: 10am (SR 15.4A)

First Session: Wed 09 Nov: 12.00 - 17.00 (SR 15.4A)
                       Thu 10 Nov: 10:00 - 16:00 (SR 15.4A)

Presentations: Mo 16 Jan: 10:00 - 15:00 (SR 15.4A)



50% Discussion and Presentation

50% Seminar Paper



Papers for Discussion During Session 1

Thomson, W. (2016): "Fair Allocation: Concepts and Basic Results", in: Brandt, F., Conitzer, V., Endriss, U., Lang, U. and A.D. Procaccia (eds.): "Handbook of Computational Social Choice", Cambridge University Press (2016).
Abdulkadiroglu, A. and T. Sönmez (2013): "Matching Markets: Theory and Practice", in: Acemoglu, D., Arellano, M. and E. Dekel (eds.): "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Tenth World Congress, Volume 1, Economic Theory", 3-47.
Serrano, R. (2013): "Lloyd Shapley's Matching and Game Theory", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 599-618.
Maskin, E.S. (2008): "Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals", American Economic Review, 98(3), 567-576.
Myerson, R.B. (2008): "Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory", American Economic Review, 98, 586-603.

General Reading

Moulin, Hervé (2003): Fair Division and Collective Welfare, MIT Press.

Brams, S.J. (2008): "Fair Division", in: Weingast, B.R. and D.A. Wittman (eds.): "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy", Oxford University Press.
Brams, S.J. and A.D. Taylor (1996): Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press.
Klamler, C. (2010): "Fair Division: Procedural Approaches to Fair Division in Various Contexts", in: Eden, C. and D.M. Kilgour (eds.): "Handbook of Group Decision and Negotiation", Springer, Berlin.
Moulin, H. (2002): "Axiomatic Cost and Surplus Sharing", in: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A.K. and K. Suzumura (eds.): "Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare", Vol. 1, Elsevier Science.
Thomson, W. (1994): "Cooperative Models of Bargaining", in: Aumann, R.H. and S. Hart (eds.): "Handbook of Game Theory", Elsevier Science.


Grading scheme:
0      - 50   Pkte. = 5
50,1 - 60   Pkte. = 4
60,1 - 70   Pkte. = 3
70,1 - 80   Pkte. = 2
80,1 - 100 Pkte. = 1

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