Solar power play: Uncovering political capture in distributing electricity access

Published in World Development 2025

Governments across the Global South are increasingly integrating energy access investments with social safety net programs to address rural energy poverty. Yet, the success of these programs often hinges on how resources are distributed at the local level. This study investigates the role of political representation and local favoritism in shaping the allocation of off-grid solar home systems under the TR/Kabita solar energy program in Bangladesh (2017–2021).

Using comprehensive data covering 6,715 villages and combining village-level solar system allocations with detailed biographical information on over 670 elected local leaders, we examine how the birthplaces of local politicians affect energy distribution decisions. Applying a Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, our results show strong evidence of birthplace favoritism: villages represented by an elected leader born there received 13.4% more solar home systems, on average.

We further analyze the structure and hierarchy of local political representation in Bangladesh’s two-tier local government system. Villages represented by only one leader received disproportionately more solar systems than those with multiple leaders, suggesting that competition among co-representatives can dilute individual influence. Additionally, power hierarchies matter: rural council leaders (lower-tier) show stronger favoritism toward their home villages, particularly in allocating household systems that provide private benefits. In contrast, upper-tier leaders exhibit favoritism primarily for non-household (community-based) systems.

The degree of political capture also varies with electoral diversity. We find stronger favoritism in electorally fragmented villages, likely due to weaker accountability and the incentives this creates for targeting benefits to favored communities.

These findings carry critical implications for policy design. While solar safety net programs aim to overcome last-mile delivery challenges, discretionary decision-making by local elites can undermine equity goals, deepening access disparities. Our results suggest that the TR/Kabita program may have inadvertently reinforced existing inequalities in electricity access, with politically connected villages benefiting disproportionately.

By offering micro-level evidence on how local political dynamics shape energy distribution, this paper contributes to the literature on political economy, local governance, and development. The insights are directly relevant for other countries implementing similar programs in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, where off-grid electrification is essential for achieving universal energy access.