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Meinong Studies/Meinong Studien, Berlin—Boston: De Gruyter. Co-editor with Mauro Antonelli.

Grazer Philosophische Studien — International Journal for Analytic Philosophy, Leiden—Boston: Brill—Rodopi. Co-editor with Johannes Brandl, Maria Reicher, and Leopold Stubenberg. 

Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1994.

Guest editor of Definitions: Philosophical Studies 72 (1993).

Co-editor (with Leopold Stubenberg) of Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Chisholm (Philosophical Essays in Honor of Roderick M. Chisholm), Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986.


Experimental Philosophy, Gettier-Cases, and Pragmatic Projection. In B. Borstner and S. Gartner, eds.,  Thought Experiments Between Nature and Society: A Festschrift for Nenad Miščević. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2017: 172-184.

The Idealist Master Argument. In A. Oberprantacher and A. Siegetsleitner, eds., Mensch sein – Fundament, Imperativ oder Floskel? Beiträge zum 10. Internationalen Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Philosophie in Innsbruck. Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press 2017: 639-645.

Anti-Realism. Disputatio 8,43 (2016): 173-185.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2015.

Lynch's Functionialist Theory of Truth. In  N. Pedersen and C. Wright, eds., Truth and Pluralism, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013: 42-68.

How To Take Truth As a Goal? In C. Jaeger and W. Loeffler, eds., Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreements (Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium), Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2012: 203-214.

Lehrer on Trustworthiness and Acceptance. Philosophical Studies 161 (2012): 7-15.

The Correspondence Theory of Truth. In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009 (first version 2002; second version 2005). Russian translation (2005 version) in Episteme 5 (Yekaterinburg: Ural State Univ. Publishing 2007): 147-77. Spanish translation (2002 version): La teoria de la verdad como correspondencia. Discusiones Filosoficas 5 (2004): 165-90.

Defending Existentialism? In Maria Reicher, ed., States of Affairs, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2009: 167-208.

Truth-Making and Correspondence. In: E. J. Lowe and A. Rami, eds., Truth and Truth-Making, Stocksfield: Acumen/Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009: 137-57.

Knowledge-Closure and Skepticism; with Ted Warfield. In Q. Smith, ed., Epistemology: New  Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008: 137-87.

Quine’s Ladder: Two and a Half Pages from the Philosophy of Logic. In French, Uehling, Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (2008): 274-312.

Tarski’s Convention T and the Concept of Truth. In New Essays on Tarski and Philosophy, ed. by Douglas Patterson, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press 2008: 133-57.

A Substitutional Theory of Truth? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2006): 182-95.

Horwich’s World. In P. Greenough and M. P. Lynch, eds., Truth and Realism, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2006: 203-7.

Armstrong On Truthmaking. In H. Beebe and J. Dodd, eds., Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005: 141-59.

On ‘Truth is Good’. In Philosophical Books 46 (2005): 292-301.

Some T-Biconditionals. In B. Armour-Garb and J.C. Beall, eds., Deflationary Truth, Chicago: Open Court 2005: 382-419.

Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis. In M. Steup and E. Sosa, eds., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell 2005: 296-312.

Theories of Truth. In I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Wolenski, eds., Handbook of Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004: 331-414.

Don’t Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (2004): 42-47. Reprinted in F. Jackson and G. Priest, eds., Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004: 43-8.

Content Essentialism. Acta Analytica 17 (2002): 103-114.

Truth and Identity. In J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, eds., Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, New York-London: Seven Bridges Press 2002: 124-41.

Minimalism and the Facts about Truth. In Richard Schantz, ed., What is Truth? Berlin/New York: Walter De Gruyter 2002: 161-75.

Truth as Identity and Truth as Correspondence. In Michael P. Lynch, ed., The Nature of Truth: From the Classic to the Contemporary, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 2001: 683-704.

Truth as the Epistemic Goal. In Matthias Steup, ed., Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001: 151-69.

Kim’s Functionalism. In J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1997: 133-48.

Two Conceptions of the Synthetic A Priori. In Lewis E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 25), Chicago: Open Court 1997: 629-51.

Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth. In J. E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 10: Metaphysics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1996: 281-96. Reprinted in K. Lehrer and J. C. Marek, eds., Austrian Philosophy Past and Present, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997: 203-19.

On the Roles of Trustworthiness and Acceptance. In J. Brandl, W. L. Gombocz und C. Piller, eds., Metamind, Knowledge and Coherence: Essays on the Philosophy of Keith Lehrer, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1991: 93-107.

Neither Mentioning ‘Brains in a Vat’ Nor Mentioning Brains in a Vat Will Prove That We Are Not Brains in a Vat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 891-96.

Common Sense und Außenwelt (Common Sense and External World). In W. Gombocz, H. Rutte, W. Sauer, eds., Traditionen und Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie: Festschrift für Rudolf Haller (Traditions and Perspectives of Analytical Philosophy: In Honor of Rudolf Haller), Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempski 1989: 272-83.

Truth, Eliminativism, and Disquotationalism. Noûs 23 (1989): 599-614.

Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense (The Problem of the Criterion and Common Sense). In M. David and L. Stubenberg, eds., Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Chisholm, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1986: 3-16.

Non-Existence and Reid’s Conception of Conceiving. In R. Haller, ed., Non-Existence and Predication, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1985: 585-99.

Propositionen (Propositions). Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1985): 38-58.


Review of Truth as One and Many by Michael P. Lynch. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2011): 743-6.

Review of From A Deflationary Point of View by Paul Horwich (Oxford 2004), in Mind 116 (2007): 427-34.

Künne on Conceptions of Truth. Review essay of W. Künne’s, Conceptions of Truth (Oxford 2003), in Grazer Philosophische Studien 70 (2005): 179-91.

Review of Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its Critics by Gerald Vision (MIT Press 2004), in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005.

Review of Truth: A Primer by Frederick F. Schmitt (Westview 1995), in Philosophcial Review 106 (1997): 441-3.

Review Essay on Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology by Richard Foley (Oxford 1993), in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1996): 943-52.

Critical Notice of Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty (K. Mulligan, ed., Kluwer 1990), in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1993): 229-32.

Introduction to Definitions: Philosophical Studies 72 (1993): 111-14.

Critical Notice of Zeichen und Bezeichnetes: Sprachphilosophische Untersuchungen zum Problem der Referenz by Edmund Runggaldier (Walter de Gruyter 1985), in Philosophy and History 21 (1988): 31-34.

Critical Notice of The Metaphysics of Gottlob Frege by Eike-Henner Kluge (Martinus Nijhoff 1980), in Grazer Philosophische Studien 21 (1984): 210-12.

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr.phil.

Marian David

Univ.-Prof. Mag. Dr.phil. Marian David Institut für Philosophie

Institut für Philosophie

Telefon:+43 316 380 - 2304

Sprechstunde: Donnerstag, 18:45 - 19:45

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