my phd students

I have supervised a fair number of phd students, most at the University of Bielefeld. They were very good. Unfortunately (from my point of view) most of them decided to go into the private sector after completion of their theses. But many of their papers from their PhD theses are very nice and I would like to share the ones I know and like best here with the world. My students are in bold.

• Idiosyncratic preferences in games on networks, Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, Vol 131, 29-50, by Olena Orlova
• Comment on “Smith (1995): Perfect finite horizon folk theorem”, online comment in Econometrica, 2019, Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa and Andrea Wilson
• A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games, International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, Vol 49, 1129–1142, Ghislain Herman Demeze Jouatsa
• Probabilistic transitivity in sports, Computers & Operations Research, 2019, Vol 112, Philipp Külpmann and Johannes Tiwisina
• Identifying the Reasons for Coordination Failure in a Laboratory Experiment, Philipp Külpmann and Davit Khantadze
• Rational Delay of Effort in Projects with Uncertain Requirements, R&R at Economic Theory, Philipp Külpmann
• Strategic formation of homogeneous bargaining networks, Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, Vol 106, 51-74, Florian Gauer and Tim Hellmann
• Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations, accepted at International Econonomic Review, Florian Gauer and Christoph Kuzmics
• A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the lab, forthcoming at Economic Theory, Christoph Kuzmics and Daniel Rodenburger (master student)
• International environmental agreements for local and global pollution, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 2017, Vol 81, 38-58, Michael Günther and Tim Hellmann. 
• A note on "Renegotiation in repeated games", Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, Vol 114, 318-323, Michael Günther, Christoph Kuzmics, and Antoine Salomon
• Full revelation under optional verification, Economics Letters, 2019, Vol 176, 14-16, Simon Schopohl
• Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, Vol 84 (2), 681-700, Costel Andonie and Christoph Kuzmics, [Supplementary Material] Self-archived here.
• Quality uncertainty with imperfect information acquisition, R&R at Economic Theory (but never revised - not enough time before starting his job in a global IT consulting firm), Christopher Gertz. Christopher studies a model in which a monopoly seller of a product with uncertain quality faces consumers who can receive a signal about the true quality at some cost. Christopher is interested in the monopolist's pricing decisions, especially in the limit as these costs tend to zero. Key take aways: 1) easier information access is typically worse for the consumers, 2) the limit in which costs of information tends to zero is not quite like the case of full information. 
• A model of quality uncertainty with a continuum of quality levels. Christopher Gertz. Christopher points out several suprising differences of equilibria in adverse selection models with a finite and an infinite number of quality levels.
• Information Uncertainty in Auction Theory (complete PhD thesis), Nikoleta van Welbergen. The thesis has three chapters, at least two of which I think are ultimately very publishable. The thesis may not be written perfectly, but the math all strikes me as correct. In chapter 2 she studies auctions with correlated private values, in which the famous Cremer McLean (1988) Full Surplus Extraction result holds. She then considers small deviations from the common prior assumption and provides an upper bound for the mass of models close to the common prior model in which the Cremer McLean mechanism fails. This chapter, in my opinion, provides a complementary analysis to similar non-robustness results of Neeman and Heifetz (2006) and Barelli (2009). In chapter 4 she asks herself why we do not see more all-pay auctions in practice. She considers a model in which a seller chooses auction format and then buyers make their bids. The seller may be honest and follow protocol or may be somewhat of a cheat and asks an agent to bid on his behalf (i.e. to participate in the auction). In such a model the essentially only sequential equilibrium is one in which different types of sellers pool on a second price auction. The setup of her model is somewhat limited to a few auction formats, but I expect her result could be generalized to more auction formats. As Nikoleta is working in the private sector I am afraid these papers will never be published.