- Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values. With Yuval Heller, September 2019. Supplementary Online Appendix.
- On the predictive power of theories of one-shot play. With Philipp Külpmann, August 2019.
- Is Ellsberg behavior evidence of ambiguity aversion? With Brian Rogers and Xiannong Zhang, August 2019. Videos used for advice: in favor of hedging physical coin, against hedging physical coin, virtual coin, in favor of hedging virtual coin, against hedging virtual coin.
- Limit orders under Knightian uncertainty. With Michael Greinecker, February 2019.
- The distribution of article quality and inefficiencies in the market for scientific journals. With Philipp Kohlgruber, October 2017.
- The evolution of taking roles. With Florian Herold, August 2017. Supplementary material.
- A necessary condition for symmetric completely mixed Nash equilibria. With Florian Herold, August 2017.
- Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations. With Florian Gauer, revised July, 2017.
- The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences are State-Independent. With Christoph Diehl, 3rd version, December 2014. Second version (same title). January 2014. First version: The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria. October 2013.
- Coordination with Independent Private Values: Why Pedestrians Sometimes Bump into Each Other, February 2014. I wrote this paper without knowing this 2007 paper by Bill Sandholm, which is a mostly more comprehensive analysis than mine. I like the story in my paper, but there is little added value in terms of formal results. However this paper has eventually led to Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values - with Yuval Heller, September 2019 and supplementary online appendix (see also above), which does have very new results.
- An incomplete information justification of symmetric equilibrium in symmetric games.
With Brian Rogers, November 2010.
- The Evolution of Moral Codes of Behavior. With Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert, revised May 2009.
- Individual and group selection in symmetric 2-player games. November 2003.
Christoph KuzmicsInstitut für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre