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[26] Prevalence Estimation from Random Samples and Census Data with Participation Bias. With Stéphane Guerrier and Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser, forthcoming at the Journal of the American Statistical Association. Last working paper version

[25] Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values. With Yuval HellerGames and Economic Behavior, 2024, 143, 51-76. The paper provides an explanation, I believe, for somewhat complex norms of behavior as I captured, for instance, in this video of cyclists in Kyoto managing to get past each other.

[24] Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment. With Philipp KülpmannJournal of Economic Theory, 2022, 205, 105554. 42min presentation at University of Bamberg. Open Access.

[23] The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences are State-Independent. With Christoph Diehl, International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, 50, 911–925. Open Access.

[22] Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations. With Florian Gauer, International Economic Review, 2020, 61 (4), 1659-1678. Open Access. 49min general audience talk

[21] A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the lab. With Daniel Rodenburger, Economic Theory, 2020, 70, 685–721. Open Access.

[20] The evolution of taking roles. With Florian Herold, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, 174, 38-63. Last working paper version.

[19] Efficiency based measures of inequality. With Costel Andonie and Brian RogersJournal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, 85, 60-69. Last working paper version.

[18] A note on "Renegotiation in repeated games". With Michael Günther and Antoine SalomonGames and Economic Behavior, 2019, 114, 318-323. Last working paper version.

[17] Preferences Under Ignorance. With Olivier Gossner, International Economic Review, 2019, 60 (1), 241-257. Previous version: Evolutionary foundations of rational choice. November 2009. Open Access.

[16] The refined best-response correspondence and backward induction. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef Hofbauer, German Economic Review, 2019, 20 (1), 52-66. Last working paper version.

[15] Abraham Wald's Complete Class Theorem and Knightian Uncertainty. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 666-673. Last working paper version. Previous versions: A rational ambiguity averse person will never display her ambiguity aversion. April 2013. An alternative subjective expected utility representation theorem. August 2012. Inferring Preferences from Choices under Uncertainty. March 2012

[14] On Public Good Provision with Dominant Strategies and Balanced Budget. With Jan-Henrik StegJournal of Economic Theory, 2017, 170, 56-69. Last working paper version.

[13] The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef HofbauerInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (1), 165-193. Self-archived here.

[12] Symmetric play in repeated allocation games. With Tom Palfrey and Brian RogersJournal of Economic Theory, 2014, 154, 25-67. Self-archived here.

[11] Hidden symmetries and focal points. With Carlos Alos-FerrerJournal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (1), 226-258. Self-archived here.

[10] Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef HofbauerTheoretical Economics, 2013, 8 (1), 165-192. Self-archived here.

[9] Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. With Costel AndonieJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, 84 (2), 681-700. [Supplementary Material] Self-archived here.

[8] A Comment on "Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games.” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262]. With Brian RogersGames and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), 240–242. Self-archived here.

[7] On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populationsGames and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72 (2), 452-466. Self-archived here.

[6] Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem. With Chiaki Hara and James HuangJournal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (1), 346-358. Self-archived here.

[5] Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. With Florian HeroldGames and Economic Behavior, 2009, 67 (2), 542-551. Self-archived here.

[4] Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules. With Chiaki Hara and James HuangJournal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 652-72. Self-archived here.

[3] Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect informationGames and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48 (2), 321-336. [Proof of Theorem 2] (not in the paper). Self-archived here.

[2] Tail-dependence in stock-return pairs. With Ines FortinInternational Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting Finance and Management, 2002, 11, 89-107. Self-archived here.

[1] Optimal window-width choice in spectral density estimation: Review and simulation. With Ines FortinJournal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, 2000, 67, 109-131. Self-archived here.

Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. PhD

Christoph Kuzmics

Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. PhD Christoph Kuzmics Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

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