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publications

[27] Randomization advice and ambiguity aversion. With Brian Rogers and Xiannong Zhang, accepted at the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. Last working paper version. Video V1p, Video V2p, Video V0, Video V1v, Video V2v.

[26] Prevalence Estimation from Random Samples and Census Data with Participation Bias. With Stéphane Guerrier and Maria-Pia Victoria-Feser, forthcoming at the Journal of the American Statistical Association. Last working paper version

[25] Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values. With Yuval HellerGames and Economic Behavior, 2024, 143, 51-76. The paper provides an explanation, I believe, for somewhat complex norms of behavior as I captured, for instance, in this video of cyclists in Kyoto managing to get past each other. Last working paper version.

[24] Comparing theories of one-shot play out of treatment. With Philipp KülpmannJournal of Economic Theory, 2022, 205, 105554. 42min presentation at University of Bamberg. Open Access.

[23] The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria When the Sender's Preferences are State-Independent. With Christoph Diehl, International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, 50, 911–925. Open Access.

[22] Cognitive Empathy in Conflict Situations. With Florian Gauer, International Economic Review, 2020, 61 (4), 1659-1678. Open Access. 49min general audience talk

[21] A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the lab. With Daniel Rodenburger, Economic Theory, 2020, 70, 685–721. Open Access.

[20] The evolution of taking roles. With Florian Herold, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2020, 174, 38-63. Last working paper version.

[19] Efficiency based measures of inequality. With Costel Andonie and Brian RogersJournal of Mathematical Economics, 2019, 85, 60-69. Last working paper version.

[18] A note on "Renegotiation in repeated games". With Michael Günther and Antoine SalomonGames and Economic Behavior, 2019, 114, 318-323. Last working paper version.

[17] Preferences Under Ignorance. With Olivier Gossner, International Economic Review, 2019, 60 (1), 241-257. Previous version: Evolutionary foundations of rational choice. November 2009. Open Access.

[16] The refined best-response correspondence and backward induction. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef Hofbauer, German Economic Review, 2019, 20 (1), 52-66. Last working paper version.

[15] Abraham Wald's Complete Class Theorem and Knightian Uncertainty. Games and Economic Behavior, 2017, 104, 666-673. Last working paper version. Previous versions: A rational ambiguity averse person will never display her ambiguity aversion. April 2013. An alternative subjective expected utility representation theorem. August 2012. Inferring Preferences from Choices under Uncertainty. March 2012

[14] On Public Good Provision with Dominant Strategies and Balanced Budget. With Jan-Henrik StegJournal of Economic Theory, 2017, 170, 56-69. Last working paper version.

[13] The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef HofbauerInternational Journal of Game Theory, 2015, 44 (1), 165-193. Self-archived here.

[12] Symmetric play in repeated allocation games. With Tom Palfrey and Brian RogersJournal of Economic Theory, 2014, 154, 25-67. Self-archived here.

[11] Hidden symmetries and focal points. With Carlos Alos-FerrerJournal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148 (1), 226-258. Self-archived here.

[10] Refined best-response correspondence and dynamics. With Dieter Balkenborg and Josef HofbauerTheoretical Economics, 2013, 8 (1), 165-192. Self-archived here.

[9] Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. With Costel AndonieJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2012, 84 (2), 681-700. [Supplementary Material] Self-archived here.

[8] A Comment on "Egalitarianism and Efficiency in Repeated Symmetric Games.” by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32 (2000) 247–262]. With Brian RogersGames and Economic Behavior, 2012, 74 (1), 240–242. Self-archived here.

[7] On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populationsGames and Economic Behavior, 2011, 72 (2), 452-466. Self-archived here.

[6] Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem. With Chiaki Hara and James HuangJournal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (1), 346-358. Self-archived here.

[5] Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. With Florian HeroldGames and Economic Behavior, 2009, 67 (2), 542-551. Self-archived here.

[4] Representative consumer's risk aversion and efficient risk-sharing rules. With Chiaki Hara and James HuangJournal of Economic Theory, 2007, 137, 652-72. Self-archived here.

[3] Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect informationGames and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48 (2), 321-336. [Proof of Theorem 2] (not in the paper). Self-archived here.

[2] Tail-dependence in stock-return pairs. With Ines FortinInternational Journal of Intelligent Systems in Accounting Finance and Management, 2002, 11, 89-107. Self-archived here.

[1] Optimal window-width choice in spectral density estimation: Review and simulation. With Ines FortinJournal of Statistical Computation and Simulation, 2000, 67, 109-131. Self-archived here.

Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. PhD

Christoph Kuzmics

Univ.-Prof. Dipl.-Ing. PhD Christoph Kuzmics Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre

+43 316 380 - 7111


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